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INTRODUCTION 
In her elegant and lively address, Chief Judge Wood suggests exposing 
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, created in 1982 to hear all appeals 
from patent cases, to competition from other appellate courts.1 Under Judge 
Wood’s proposal, parties would have the choice of seeking review either in the 
regional circuit in which the district court was located or in the Federal Circuit.2 
Judge Wood indicates that the Federal Circuit would likely “still play a leading 
role in shaping patent law,” with regional courts simply allowing room for new 
ideas and allowing for fuller development of issues before they reach the 
Supreme Court.3 Judge Wood would also institute consolidation procedures to 
address concerns about parties filing different appeals in different circuits over 
the same patent.4 In some respects, therefore, Judge Wood’s proposal could be 
seen as relatively modest. 
In patent circles, by contrast, proposals to give regional courts any role in 
the development of patent law have generally been viewed as modest only in the 
Swiftian sense. Where Judge Wood sees beneficial competition and 
experimentation, many patent lawyers see unsustainable levels of uncertainty. 
Patent lawyers won the debate in the early 1980s. Congress was 
convinced of the need to promote greater uniformity and certainty through 
centralization.5 In general, proponents of uniformity and predictability have on 
their side elements of historical tradition that equate patents not simply with 
property, but with a very specific vision of inviolable tangible property.6 
  
 * Copyright © 2014 Arti K. Rai. Elvin R. Latty Professor, Duke Law School; 
Director, Duke Law Center for Innovation Policy. Thank you to Daniel Mandell for 
helpful comments. 
 1 See Hon. Diane P. Wood, Is It Time to Abolish the Federal Circuit’s Exclusive 
Jurisdiction in Patent Cases?, 13 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 1 (2013). 
 2 Id. at 9–10. 
 3 Id. at 10. 
 4 Id. 
 5 See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 5 (1981) (“the creation of the Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit will promote desirable uniformity . . . .”). 
 6 See, e.g., Adam Mossoff, Patents as Constitutional Private Property: The 
Historical Protection of Patents Under the Takings Clause, 87 B.U. L. REV. 689 (2007) 
(discussing cases in which nineteenth century courts applied Takings Doctrine to 
patents).  
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2478457 
Competing with the “Patent Court”: 
No. 2] A Newly Robust Ecosystem 387 
 
 
 
 
Although these historical accounts are in tension with post-realist 
understandings of how property law works,7 and arguably in tension with the 
utilitarian goals of patent law, they enjoy considerable appeal nationally and are 
regularly deployed by U.S. government actors in international fora.8 
Considerations of political economy are not on Judge Wood’s side. 
Legislative prospects aside, Judge Wood’s proposal does pose sharply the 
normative question of whether (and to what extent) the Federal Circuit needs 
competition. In this response, I argue that competition is indeed desirable. 
Whether such competition is best provided through additional appellate courts is 
unclear, however. In any event, given our current structure, the more tractable 
approach is to improve competitive input from sources that have already 
emerged. These include dissenting Federal Circuit judges, parties and amici who 
are not “patent insiders,” and perhaps, above all, the executive branch. 
I. WHY COMPETITION IS DESIRABLE 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) has 
taken seriously the vision of uniformity and predictability articulated by 
Congress in 1982. The court’s often formalistic jurisprudence9 and its frequent 
emphasis on stare decisis, arguably promote the Congressional vision. 
Additionally, where panels have diverged significantly, or where dissents in 
three-judge panels have called out important differences of opinion among 
judges, the CAFC has often convened en banc panels in an attempt to iron out 
differences.10 In fact, even where the CAFC has created vertical uncertainty—
for example, by reviewing de novo factual questions already decided by district 
  
 7 Michael A. Carrier, Cabining Intellectual Property Through a Property Paradigm, 
54 DUKE L.J. 1, 1 (2004) (discussing the many ways in which property law “is not as 
absolute as is often claimed”); Carol M. Rose, Canons of Property Talk, or, Blackstone’s 
Anxiety, 108 YALE L.J. 601, 603 (1998) (noting that “Blackstone himself was thoroughly 
aware of . . . pervasive and serious qualifications on exclusive dominion.”); cf. Adam 
Mossoff, The Use and Abuse of IP at the Birth of the Administrative State, 157 U. PA. L. 
REV. 2001 (2009) (criticizing legal realists’ arguments against Lockean theory, including 
arguments based on patents). 
 8 Arti K. Rai, U.S. Executive Branch Patent Policy, Global and Domestic, in PATENT 
LAW IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 85, 88–91 (Ruth L. Okediji & Margo A. Bagley, eds., 
2014).  
 9 See, e.g., Peter Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, 120 YALE L.J. 2, 75–81 
(2010) (contrasting the Supreme Court’s “holistic” jurisprudence with Federal Circuit 
formalism). 
 10 See, e.g., Ryan Vacca, Acting Like an Administrative Agency: The Federal Circuit 
En Banc, 76 MO. L. REV. 733, 736–39 (2011) (finding that the Federal Circuit takes 
patent cases en banc more frequently than other appellate courts take their en banc). 
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courts,11 it has defended itself by invoking horizontal certainty. Under this 
argument, de novo review of both legal and factual issues promotes horizontal 
certainty by ensuring that the CAFC resolves in a uniform fashion any 
divergence that emerges from evaluation of the same patent by different district 
courts.12 Although the CAFC’s arguments are, in my view, ultimately flawed, 
the CAFC is hardly unaware of the virtues of certainty. 
How well the court has done on other desirable goals—most notably, 
setting up a regime that, within the limits of statutory language, promotes 
innovation—is less clear. Although formalism, uniformity, and predictability 
can promote innovation, they can also retard it. 
Consider the one-time Federal Circuit requirement that proof of non-
obviousness require a “teaching, suggestion, or motivation” (TSM) to combine 
prior art. By the late 1990s, the Federal Circuit was not only employing this test 
regularly, but it was often employing a particularly formalistic version of the 
doctrine that required a written TSM. Although the results of such a doctrine 
may have been uniform and predictable, the equally predictable result of 
reducing non-obviousness to mere novelty was a proliferation of trivial patents. 
More generally, as the court’s jurisprudence of non-obviousness has shown, 
expertise in the “law” of patents does not imply expertise in relevant economic 
and scientific questions. 
For its part, the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) vigorously contested 
the Federal Circuit’s application of a written TSM requirement. In a wave of 
cases, the PTO unsuccessfully defended before the Federal Circuit examiner 
decisions that invoked common knowledge rather than written TSM as their 
basis for combining prior art.13 However, the agency did not immediately 
position itself as a clear competitor to the Federal Circuit. It declined to appeal 
its losses to the Supreme Court. As Judge Wood’s analysis might suggest, and as 
Craig Nard and John Duffy have explicitly argued,14 the agency may have been 
reluctant to directly challenge a court with a monopoly on intermediate appellate 
scrutiny. Historically, the PTO’s position has been particularly weak because it 
has not been given Chevron deference on questions of substantive law. 
  
 11 See, e.g., Paul R. Gugliuzza, The Federal Circuit as a Federal Court, 54 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1791, 1830–41 (2013) (discussing the Federal Circuit’s active role as a 
fact-finder). 
 12 The majority and dissent in the Federal Circuit’s most recent en banc opinion on 
patent claim construction respectively argue the case for horizontal certainty and vertical 
certainty. Lightning Ballast Control LLC v. Philips Elec. N. Am. Corp., 744 F.3d 1272 
(Fed. Cir. 2014) (en banc). 
 13 See, e.g., In re Zurko, 258 F.3d 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re Sang-Su Lee, 277 F.3d 
1338 (Fed. Cir. 2002).  
 14 Craig Allen Nard & John F. Duffy, Rethinking Patent Law’s Uniformity Principle, 
101 NW. U. L. REV. 1619, 1641 (2007) (“[T]he PTO is, as a practical matter, subordinate 
to the court. This routine relationship may make the PTO hesitant to challenge the 
Federal Circuit frequently or vigorously.”). 
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That said, the executive branch as a whole, speaking through the Solicitor 
General, did ultimately assert itself forcefully as a competitor to the Federal 
Circuit. In response to the Court’s “call for the views of the Solicitor General” 
(CVSG) in the 2007 KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc. case,15 the government argued 
in favor of a certiorari grant on the grounds that the PTO should “be allowed to 
bring to bear its full expertise—including its reckoning of the basic knowledge 
and common sense possessed by persons in particular fields of endeavor—when 
making the predictive judgment whether an invention would have been obvious 
to a person of ordinary skill in the art.”16 In keeping with the government’s 
position, the Supreme Court not only granted certiorari but ultimately held that 
“[r]igid preventative rules that deny [factfinders] recourse to common sense are 
neither necessary under, nor consistent with, this Court’s case law.”17 
How might the case have come out differently under Judge Wood’s 
proposed regime? Under Wood’s proposal, a competitor court might have 
adopted a position that diverged from that of the Federal Circuit. A divergent 
ruling by a competitor appellate court might have forced the KSR issue upon the 
Supreme Court more quickly. Additionally, once the Supreme Court took the 
case, it would have had the benefit of opinions, and perhaps even a certain 
amount of litigation practice, under two different regimes. 
As Judge Wood herself notes, however, under her proposal “[t]he 
absolute number of patent cases that would return to the regional courts would 
not be large.”18 By definition, then, any given circuit would probably see a very 
small number of patent cases. Under those circumstances, no circuit would be 
likely to emerge as a forceful or nimble competitor. For this reason, Professors 
Craig Nard and John Duffy, who have also argued for appellate competition 
(and who Judge Wood cites), suggest an “optimization” strategy under which 
two or three appellate courts would compete to develop patent law.19 
II. WOULD ADDITIONAL APPELLATE COURTS BE WORTHWHILE? 
In 1982, two or three appellate courts might have been an option worth 
considering, particularly if any uncertainty posed by such an option had been 
countered through greater centralization and development of expertise at the trial 
level. As discussed in Part III, however, competition in the appellate process is 
not an obviously superior choice for marshalling relevant evidence. In any 
event, over thirty years later, the cost-benefit analysis is different. Even without 
  
 15 Supreme Court docket for KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., SUPREME COURT OF THE 
UNITED STATES, http://www.supremecourt.gov/Search.aspx?FileName=/docketfiles/04-
1350.htm (last visited May 27, 2014). 
 16 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 26, KSR Int’l 
Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007) (No. 04-1350), 2006 WL 2453601. 
 17 KSR Int’l, 127 S. Ct. at 1732. 
 18 Wood, supra note 1, at 10. 
 19 See Nard & Duffy, supra note 14, at 1637–41. 
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circuit splits, the Supreme Court now takes at least a few patent cases every 
year. This pattern emerged in 2006, and it currently shows no sign of abating. 
In lieu of circuit splits, the Supreme Court appears to rely on the presence 
of vigorous participation by industry amici at the certiorari stage,20 dissents in 
three-judge panel and en banc Federal Circuit decisions,21 and perhaps, above 
all, the views of the executive branch. Indeed, in his recent work, Professor 
Duffy highlights the role of the Solicitor General in counseling the Court 
regarding which issues to take and how to rule on those issues.22 I have built on 
Professor Duffy’s work to show how, in various important cases, the Solicitor 
General represents not simply the PTO, but also a number of other agencies with 
interests in patent questions.23 Unlike the PTO, these other agencies are not 
likely to see themselves as subordinate to the Federal Circuit. Moreover, while 
the PTO has sometimes been accused of having “pro-patent” tendencies, 
executive branch agencies like the National Institute of Health and the Antitrust 
Division of the Department of Justice (not to mention independent agencies like 
the Federal Trade Commission) cannot be viewed as “pro-patent.” 
The executive branch’s role as a very significant competitor of the 
Federal Circuit is now clear. From 1996 through June 2013, the executive 
branch participated either as a party or an amicus in twenty-three of twenty-six 
cases taken by the Court. Of the fourteen cases in which the executive branch 
disagreed with the Federal Circuit, the executive branch’s position prevailed in 
all but two. 
For purposes of promoting diverse views in patent litigation, one of these 
executive branch victories, the 2007 Supreme Court case of MedImmune, Inc. v. 
Genentech, Inc.,24 may be particularly notable. While MedImmune’s affirmation 
  
 20 For example, in Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Limited P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 1843, 1843 
(2011), which addressed the “presumption of validity” accorded to granted patents, the 
Court may have been influenced by industry amicus briefs criticizing the rule enunciated 
by the Federal Circuit. The Court granted certiorari in that case even without any 
apparent dissent within the Federal Circuit or from the executive branch. 
 21 See, e.g., Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 653 
F.3d 1329, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Bryson, J., dissenting); Hyatt v. Kappos, 625 F.3d 
1320, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (Dyk, J., dissenting); Novo Nordisk A/S v. Caraco Pharma. 
Labs., Ltd., 601 F.3d 1359, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (Dyk, J., dissenting); CLS Bank Int’l v. 
Alice Corp., Pty. Ltd., 717 F.3d 1269, 1273 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (multiple 
concurrences and dissents). 
 22 John F. Duffy, The Federal Circuit in the Shadow of the Solicitor General, 78 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 518, 519 (2010) (“The innovative jurisdiction structure of the new 
appellate court has fostered a unique relationship between the Federal Circuit and the 
Solicitor General’s Office and has, in a subtle but meaningful way, shifted power over the 
development of patent law to the executive branch of the government.”). 
 23 Arti K. Rai, Patent Validity Across the Executive Branch: Ex Ante Foundations for 
Policy Development, 61 DUKE L.J. 1237, 1244–48 (2012). 
 24 MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 764 (2007). 
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of licensee standing to sue for patent invalidity does not throw open the 
courthouse doors to all who might wish to challenge patents, it does suggest a 
greater openness to new types of challengers. In addition to patent skeptics from 
the information technology industry,25 new voices such as the American Civil 
Liberties Union, which represented the Association of Molecular Pathologists in 
the 2013 Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc.26 gene 
patent case, are likely to make non-traditional arguments. One doesn’t have to 
agree with those arguments (and I do not)27 to agree that they deserve 
consideration. Indeed, in the case of the patent eligibility of genes, a significant 
problem was that the litigating parties in the pre-MedImmune era, all of whom 
had gene patents, had no incentive to make arguments that gene patents, as a 
category, failed to promote innovation. Thus, these arguments arose only 
decades after the PTO started granting patents on genes, with the perhaps 
predictable result that Federal Circuit judges invoked stare decisis and 
retroactivity as reasons for upholding even patents that they might not allowed 
“on a blank canvas.”28 
III. ASSESSING THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH ROLE 
Of course, competition from the executive branch is not the same as 
competition within Article III courts. Only competition from another appellate 
court can create a “laboratory” in which different approaches to patent law are 
tested. Indeed, Judge Wood’s brief reference to random assignment of appeals 
hints at the possibility of a true natural experiment.29 
Absent competing appellate courts that might provide a “real world” 
variation that the Supreme Court could analyze, some have suggested that the 
Court’s role should be relatively circumscribed.30 I am not so sure. The Court 
  
 25 See generally Colleen V. Chien, Patent Amicus Briefs: What the Courts’ Friends 
Can Teach Us About the Patent System, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 395, 421–22 (2011) 
(finding that in Federal Circuit and amicus briefs, only 5% of briefs filed by high-
technology firms favored the patentee, as contrasted with 98% filed by patent holding 
firms). 
 26 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013). 
 27 Arti K. Rai, Biomedical Patents at the Supreme Court, 66 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 
111, 114–15 (Oct. 11, 2013), available at 
http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/sites/default/files/online/articles/RaiSLR.pdf.  
 28 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 689 F.3d 1303, 1343 (Fed. 
Cir. 2012) (Moore, J., concurring) (“If I were deciding this case on a blank canvas, I 
might conclude that an isolated DNA sequence that includes most or all of a gene is not 
patentable subject matter.”). 
 29 Wood, supra note 1, at 9–10. 
 30 See, e.g., John Golden, The Supreme Court as “Prime Percolator”: A Prescription 
for Appellate Review of Questions in Patent Law, 56 UCLA L. REV. 657 (2009) (arguing 
that because the Supreme Court lacks a deep foundation in patent law, it should issue 
limited decisions). 
 
392 Chicago-Kent Journal of Intellectual Property [Vol. 13 
 
 
 
can obviously make important contributions in those cases where it is called 
upon to decide power allocation between different patent institutions, or to 
ensure that patent law does not become divorced from other areas of law.31 As 
for cases at the core of substantive patent law, such as non-obviousness 
jurisprudence, input from the executive branch can signal to the Supreme Court 
that the Federal Circuit’s jurisprudence has veered significantly off course and 
suggest the type of intervention that is necessary. In general, with the notable 
exception of certain cases involving the notoriously difficult question of Section 
101 patent eligibility,32 the Supreme Court has done a reasonable job with many 
questions of substantive patent law. 
Notably, in at least some respects, competition from a coordinate branch 
may have advantages that competition from an appellate court would not yield. 
At least in theory, a coordinate branch, and perhaps especially the executive 
branch, can bring to bear expertise that no Article III court possesses. In the area 
of patent law, the relevant expertise is economic and scientific. Thus far, with 
the possible exception of cases like Myriad and F.T.C. v. Actavis,33 executive 
branch briefing at the Supreme Court has not relied heavily on such expertise. In 
prior writing, I have proposed a more assertive White House presence on 
questions of innovation policy.34 One of the many benefits of such a presence 
would be greater marshaling of agency expertise in patent cases before the 
Supreme Court.  
A skeptic might reasonably fear that the currently productive relationship 
between the Supreme Court and the executive branch could wither. For 
example, if agencies other than the PTO were to become less interested in 
Supreme Court review, the PTO on its own terms might be reluctant to 
challenge the Federal Circuit. For this reason, it may be particularly important 
for the executive branch to make a convincing argument before the Court that 
the post-grant review proceedings set up by American Invents Act of 201135 
give the PTO the authority to make substantive patent law determinations that 
  
 31 See, e.g., Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150 (1999) (deciding allocation of power 
between PTO and the Federal Circuit as well as relationship between patent law and 
administrative law); eBay v. MercExchange, 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006) (examining the 
Federal Circuit’s patent remedies jurisprudence). 
 32 See, e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. 
Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012). 
 33 F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013). 
 34 Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Fixing Innovation Policy: A Structural 
Perspective, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 6 (2008). 
 35 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.). 
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merit Chevron deference.36 For purposes of improving competition for the 
“patent court,” a test case raising this issue will be important to watch.  
Competition through executive branch input does raise the important 
question of whether political considerations unrelated to (or even antithetical to) 
innovation could sway the executive branch. Although Chevron is premised in 
part on principles of political accountability, and innovation is hardly the only 
legitimate goal of government, I agree with the conventional wisdom that patent 
law is best understood as a regime that exists to promote innovation. To the 
extent that the executive branch was advancing arguments unrelated to 
innovation, or making abrupt changes in position following a presidential 
election, assertive judicial review would be important. Indeed, even if the 
Federal Circuit (or more likely the Supreme Court) were to accept Chevron as 
the applicable framework under certain circumstances, courts could reject 
certain executive branch arguments as either unreasonable under step 2 of 
Chevron or “arbitrary and capricious” within the meaning of the Administrative 
Procedure Act. 
CONCLUSION 
Judge Wood’s address is a timely and important reminder of the virtues of 
competition in patent law. Even if it does not result in additional appellate 
competition, it should prompt further consideration of how to improve the value 
provided by existing sources, most notably the executive branch. 
  
 36 See, e.g., Melissa Wasserman, The Changing Guard of Patent Law: Chevron 
Deference for the PTO, 54 WM. & MARY. L. REV. 1959 (2013) (arguing that certain 
American Invents Act procedures are sufficiently formal to merit Chevron deference); 
Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Who’s Afraid of the APA: What the Patent System 
Can Learn from Administrative Law, 95 GEO. L.J. 269, 320–28 (2007) (arguing that, as a 
positive and normative matter, the results of post-grant review procedures being proposed 
at the time should receive Chevron deference).  
